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Description and Explanation in Art Exegesis
M otto: » Aesthetics is a reason giving activity. «l
T he topic o f  this paper, as im plied  by the title, is a question-beggar: it 
is assum ed th a t there  is a re lation betw een descrip tion an d  exp lanation  in 
a rt exegesis. M oreover, it is a topic tha t m any aestheticians w ould be reluc­
tan t to accept as valid and  necessary to their field, so one could  believe from  
the  b eg inn ing  th a t it has a  polem ic m ainspring. If  we w ere to accep t the 
traditional disparities o f this cen tury’s philosophy, we could say that the theo­
retical status o f descrip tion  and  exp lanation  w ould n o t be  an  in te resting  
prob lem  in a herm eneu tical o r m etaphysical discourse, simply because in 
such a perspective descrip tion is he ld  as an  elem entary, self-evident o p era­
tion, while the explanation o f a rt passes for a nonsense. T he conceptual pair 
‘descrip tion -  ex p lan a tio n ’ an n o u n ced  by the title is obviously an  analytic 
binom ial. However, my in ten tion  is n o t to augm en t the d ispute, choosing 
ab initio the analytic trea tm en t o f a p rob lem  tha t had  a d ifferen t ca ree r -  
namely, a wrong career -  in the continental, ou tdated  philosophy, b u t ra th e r 
to  enhance the benefits o f pluralism , w hich can provide access to any series 
o f  co n cep ts  o r  m e th o d  th a t ind icates even the  sm allest c larifica tion  o r 
progress in u n d ers tan d in g  art. T he reason for designating the discussion o f 
a rt by an  am biguous and  eccentric term , exegesis, is tha t in my op in io n  bo th  
a rt criticism an d  aesthetics have to answer by specific m eans to two funda­
m ental questions, m ore or less explicit: ivhy does the w ork o f a r t exist, an d  
how, and  both  questions are directly re la ted  to description an d  explanation .
I said tha t the re lation betw een descrip tion  and  exp lanation  is a typi­
cally analytic question. However, if we consider it strictly from  the h istorio­
graphic perspective, its connection  with a rt exegesis seems fallacious o r ar­
tificial. From  th e  very beginning , the  leaders o f analytic tren d  ig n o red  or 
re ferred  only indirectly  to the problem s o f art, partly because those p ro b ­
lem s did  n o t seem  essential to the clarification o f the philosophical realm  
an d  know ledge, partly because its sources d id  n o t include a rt am ong  the 
m ain issues.2 Even now, w hen it is said tha t we have en te red  ‘the post-ana-
1 William Righter, Logic and Criticism, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963, p. 22.
2 Arnold Isenberg thinks that the m inor attention paid by the first analytic philosophers 
to aesthetics and art criticism is due to the fact that »none of the leaders of the 
analytic movement, such as M oore and Russell, have ventured into a field -  i.e.
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lytic e ra ’, analytic aesthetics does n o t enjoy m ore credit: on  the contrary, it 
is re jec ted  as a late syndrom e, som e sort o f  childish disease which is em bar­
rassing to  experience as a grown-up. Despite this frivolous objection, I will 
try to show, using descrip tion  an d  exp lanation  as a guideline, that, on  the 
o n e  hand , analytic aesthetics is n o t at all excessive o r tardy, and, on  the o th e r 
h and , th a t its general principles which took their classical form  decades ago, 
can still be im proved.
*
L ooking back to the  beg in n in g  o f the century, w hen the  »linguistic 
turn« em erged  from  the principles o f logical atom ism , it becom es clear that 
the  theoretical status o f  descrip tion  did n o t becom e any distinct fo r all its 
vacillations betw een th e  opposite limits o f the sam e trend . It is true  th a t in 
analytic term s description has been  discussed mainly in  its philosophical sense. 
Its connection  with a rt cam e later, and  only to the ex ten t to w hich a r t  was 
re levant as a source o f exam ples in a specialised, logical context. Naturally, 
descrip tion  proved to be a questionable issue for aesthetics only afte r it was 
ad m itted  as a general philosophical problem .
T h e  logical s tarting  p o in t in the analysis o f  descrip tion  h ad  a strong  
influence on this co n cep t’s career, including its aesthetic im plications. In his 
ce lebrated  T heory  o f D escriptions, Russell stressed th a t descrip tion  is the 
b ack g ro u n d  for a d istinc t type o f know ledge (knowledge by description), as 
distinct from  knowledge by acquaintance, the latter being logically in d ep en d en t 
from  the know ledge o f truths. Knowledge by descrip tion, a lthough  ap p ar­
ently based on sensations, depends on the know ledge o f p articu lar tru ths 
th a t m ake the connection  betw een the object described and  sensory data. 
D espite the com m on im pression tha t sensory data  result from  d irec t expe­
rience, in fact objects and  o ther peop le’s m inds canno t be known by acquain­
tance, b u t only by descrip tion . T h erefo re , d esc rip tion  is an  essen tial se­
q uence in the know ledge o f things, and, virtually, it becom es a p rerequ isite  
to any discourse that records this knowledge (be it philosophical, scientific 
o r artis tic).
In his theory o f descriptions, Russell was led to the conclusion that m ost 
o f  the  n o uns an d  p ro p e r nam es are, in fact, descriptions. M ore often  than  
n o t we have the im pression o f talking abou t things we know contiguously,
aesthetics -  that was not shunned by Bacon, Hobbes, Locke or Kant.« See Arnold 
Isenberg, »Analytic Philosophy and the Study of Art«, in Journal of Aesthetics and Art 
Criticism, 46 (1988), pp. 125-36. O ther authors, and am ong them  Richard Shusterman, 
who particularly  insists on this idea, coun t M oore as »a prototype o f analytic 
aesthetics.« See Richard Shusterm an, »Introduction: Analysing Analytic Aesthetics«, 
in Shusterm an (ed.), Analytic Aesthetics, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989, p. 4.
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b u t in fact o u r knowledge em erges from  prior, im plicit descrip tions th a t we 
are n o t aware of. T he leading part o f  descrip tion in the process o f knowl­
edge comes from  the fact that it allows us to transcend the limits o f individual 
experience and  to com m unicate it to o thers by a m eaningful language, re­
stored by logic. In o rd e r to be accepted as part o f this language, descriptions 
m ust be red u ced  to those elem ents th a t we know im mediately, and  take the 
form  o f a non-am biguous, definite description. An object is known by de­
scrip tion  w hen we know th a t » there is one and only one ob ject th a t has a 
certain  property.«3 T he m ain th ing ab o u t this defin ition  is tha t this univo­
cal re la tion  works as a tru th  condition: if there  is no  real ob ject w hich has 
the p roperty  m en tio n ed  by description, or there is more than one, th a t state­
m en t is false. As for the descriptions o f im aginary objects (non-entities), they 
m ust be transform ed into existential statem ents, whose tru th  condition  -  the 
co rresp o n d en ce  with a real object -  can eventually be verified by a n o n ­
m ediated  experience.
T he philosophical im plications o f the theory o f descrip tion  have been  
considered  so influential that Russell’s perspective was at first g ree ted  as »a 
paradigm  o f philosophy«.4 If we were to accept this enthusiastic p ercep tio n  
entirely, the consequences for aesthetics an d  a rt exegesis w ould be  devas­
tating: one  can hardly im agine a situation in  art w here an  aesthetic quality 
corresponds to a single object, in order to have definite descriptions for every 
work o f  a rt an d  to transform  the language o f  a rt exegesis in to  a »m eaning­
ful language«. Subsequently, the critics rightfully stressed th a t Russell’s de­
m ands against philosophical language are exaggerated, th a t he  d id  n o t ex­
plain how the descrip tion  works in com m on language, an d  m ainly th a t the 
univocity condition  can be satisfied only in a logical, artificial fram e. In m ost 
o f the cases, the way in which we can refer to a particu lar ob ject c an n o t be 
established excep t by particu lar circum stances: we leave it to the co n tex t to 
show which specific object we are re ferring  to. Despite the restrictive char­
ac ter th a t m akes it unrealistic, am ong the advantages o f this theory  is th a t it 
shows the im portance o f the distinction between the gram m atical form  o f a 
sen tence and  the logical form  b eh ind  it, and  th a t these two form s can n o t 
be m ade to coincide, although  the perfec t overlap would be ideal. B ut what 
I th ink  is an  essential fact abou t Russell’s theory, even if apparen tly  it ind i­
cates n o th in g  to art o r aesthetics, is the accen t on  the idea o f im plicit de­
3 By this rule o f denotation, Russell restores the principle expressed by Occam a few 
centuries ago, known as O ccam ’s razor, which confines the philosophical entities to 
those which have a correspondent in the real world.




scription underlying p ro p er names, and especially on the b inding correspon­
dence  betw een descrip tion  and  object, namely, betw een descrip tion  and  
reality.
A com pletely different view has Ludwig W ittgenstein, the o th er founder 
o f  the analytic trend , this tim e with an explicit re ference to aesthetics and  
artistic objects.5 Again, the prem ises are n o t favourable to a rt exegesis, b u t 
fo r d ifferen t reasons and  by d ifferen t argum ents. W ittgenstein found  the 
trad itional course o f aesthetics ridiculous, an d  also its official justification , 
u n ch an g ed  since the d eb u t o f this discipline: to define what is beautifu l is 
as rid iculous as it is to define a tasteful coffee, so absurd  tha t it can n o t be 
p u t in to  words.1’ W ittgenstein was convinced th a t a rt criticism an d  aesthe t­
ics are  m ean t »to express a reaction«, usually em otional, b u t it can be  a sen­
sory one as well. For this reason, aesthetic experience does n o t have too m any 
chances to transcend  the status o f a strictly individual affair, whose verbal 
transcrip tion  is so inconclusive that it becom es useless, a m ere flatus voci. A 
gesture, a sim ple exclam ation or, even better, its re ite ra tion  w ould suffice 
in  o rd e r to share such an  experience. If  we try to describe G o d ’s expression 
in M ichelangelo’s Adam  we will see that it can n o t be form ulated  and  tha t 
»we shou ld  p a in t it again«. It is easier to justify  a negative evaluation o f  an  
artistic object, because it is easier to find reasons to m otivate insatisfaction, 
th an  co n ten t. I t is so difficult to share the im pressions you have in  fro n t o f 
an  art object, tha t the chances to be approved o r u nderstood  are real only 
if  your co llocutor accidentally has the sam e reaction.
In  his essay Philosophy o f Art after Analysis and Romanticism,7 N icholas 
W olterstoff highlights the idea that, although  analytic philosophy em erged  
m ainly as a reaction  against rom an tic  essentialism  and  »expressionism «, 
analytic aesthetics d id  n o t succeed to get rid  o f all the obsessions o f ro m an ­
ticism an d  m ain ta ined  som e o f its delusions, such as »the uniqueness«, »the 
gratuitousness« and  »the autonom y« o f the work o f art. I would ad d  to this 
list an o th e r prejudice, w hich I consider to be m ore d iscordan t an d  incon­
sistent with the analytic ideal: the em otionalistic view, which bears b o th  on
5 I am talking, of course, about the later W ittgenstein and his controversial text Lectures 
and, Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
1966). H ere I would like to prevent the usual objection, which I take to be shallow 
and artificial, that these lectures are a doubtful record of W ittgenstein’s sayings, so 
th e ir  credibility should  be lesser. If we were to apply this rigour consistently, 
W ittgenstein’s single work would be the Tractatus, because it is the only book he 
published during his lifetime.
6 W ittgenstein, op. cit., II, 2.
7 N icholas W olterstoff, »Philosophy of Art after Analysis and Rom anticism «, in 
Shusterm an (ed.), op.cit., pp. 32-58.
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the art m aking and  on the art criticism. It assumes that em otions are the m ain 
source o f creation  an d  the only background  o f criticism, an d  th a t it is n o t 
the work o f a rt with its real features, b u t the reactions o f  the  perceiver tha t 
gives the topic o f a rt exegesis. U nfortunately, this residual rom anticism  per­
sists even  in  W ittg e n s te in ’s o p in io n  a b o u t  a e s th e tic s . A c c o rd in g  to  
W ittgenstein, the problem s o f aesthetics and  the problem s o f  the effects a rt 
has up o n  us are  the same thing. In a foo tno te to Lectures, th e  subject o f aes­
thetics is even m ore clearly restricted to the emotionalistic outlook: the p rob ­
lems o f aesthetics, which are due to the in fluence art has up o n  us, do  n o t 
concern  the way these things are p ro d u ced .8 T he reason why the work o f 
a rt can n o t be described is th a t o u r personal feelings can n o t be expressed, 
bu t only suggested by words, o r  ideally, by gestures. This substitution between 
the object and  the em otional reaction to it is the core o f W ittgenstein ’s view 
ab o u t descrip tion , and, eventually, ab o u t aesthetics.
W ittgenstein also rejects the possibility o f a psychology o f art, given the 
fact that he  rejects psychology in principle. N oth ing  abou t a rt would change 
as a resu lt o f  this science’s progress (even though  there w ere m any hopes 
set on  it a t that tim e), since it is doubtful we can talk about laws o f m ind which 
we can discover in the long run . T he idea o f aesthetics being  a b ran ch  o f 
psychology, as well as th a t o f  a happy tim e, w hen all the  m ysteries o f  A rt 
(w ritten with capital letters) will have been  solved thanks to psychological 
experim ents, seems to him  totally idiotic.1’ U nder these circum stances, which 
obliterate the chances o f bo th  metaphysical and  scientific approaches o f  art, 
the reach o f art exegesis canno t be otherw ise bu t insignificant to knowledge.
If we confron t Russell’s and  W ittgenstein’s views on description, we can 
notice th a t analytic aesthetics obviously inherited  from  its fo rebearers  n o th ­
ing  else b u t a  d ilem m a, perfectly  sum m arised by Shusterm an as »descrip­
tive accuracy versus prescriptive clarity«,10 and  illustrated with a short, im agi­
native fragm en t from  Philosophical Investigations: »won’t it becom e a h o p e­
less task to draw a sharp  picture corresponding  to the b lu rred  one? / . . . /  And 
this is the position  you are in if you look for definitions co rresp o n d in g  to 
o u r concepts in aesthetics o r ethics.«11 But the analytic survey o f descrip tion 
can n o t stop to these two ex trem e options, because subsequently  they p ro ­
duced  com pound  versions, m ore sophisticated, bu t m ore am biguous as well. 
Between Russell’s view, which ascribes descrip tion a m ajor role in the  p ro ­
cess o f  know ledge and  com pels it to adequacy with the reality o f  the object,
8 W ittgenstein, op.cit., IV, 1.
9 W ittgenstein, op.cit., II, 35.
10 Shusterm an, op.cit., p. 13.
11 W ittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, para. 77.
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an d  W ittgenstein’s con tem ptuous notes, w hich forbid  any relevance to aes­
thetics an d  even the possibility o f being  verbally expressed, th ere  a re  m any 
o th e r  read ings o f the problem . T he new elem ents involved are the co n n ec­
tion  betw een d esc rip tio n , evaluation  and  in te rp re ta tio n , and , fo r a less 
conform istic app roach , its openness to explanation.
A frequen t assessment in art theory and  criticism, as well as in the theory 
o f  a rgum en ta tion  and  even in epistemology, is that descrip tion  can n o t be 
separated  from  evaluation (very m uch as observation is theory-ladden). T he 
reason  fo r this overlapping  is the usual vocabulary o f descriptions, w hich is 
alm ost identical with com m on language. Faced with a logical exam ination , 
a r t  descrip tions show a serious handicap , w hich I w ould call the adjectival 
handicap. Adjectives are  n o t neutra l, and  m ore often than  n o t to choose an 
a ttrib u te  im plies a positive o r negative valorisation; w hen one describes a 
w ork o f art, one  im plicitly states a value ju d g em en t. M oreover, th e  basic 
concep ts o f aesthetics them selves seem  to be m ere adjectives, abusively in­
vested with a conceptual rank. Because o f this adjectival source, som e set all 
their hopes on analytic aesthetics, while others abandoned  this field in favour 
o f a r t theory ,12 w hich is still reg ard ed  -  probably  by virtue o f the  n a tu ra l 
ph ilosophical elitism -  as a »second order« discipline. U n d er these circum ­
stances, the question is: given its adjectival natu re , what is the role o f descrip­
tion  in analytic aesthetics? Is it com patible with its anti-subjectivist, anti-ro- 
m antic ideal and  with the search for clarity?
I th ink  the answer to this question is favourable to descrip tion. It also 
pleads fo r the philosophical pluralism  I m en tio n ed  at the beg inn ing  o f this 
text, an d  it contradicts the simplistic op in ion  th a t analytic aesthetics is an 
a ttem p t to  sterilise a r t exegesis. Even if descrip tion  seem s to d e p e n d  on  
com m on language, it does n o t disturb the analytic am bitions at all: th ere  is 
n o  n eed  to  ad o p t an  ex trem e position  and  to design a fictitious lim it case, 
in which descrip tion  is neu tra l and  evaluation is absent, as N o rth ro p  Frye 
suggested in his fam ous book o f the late 1950s, w here he calls evaluation 
»m eaningless criticism« an d  «leisure-class gossip».13 O bjections to descrip­
tion and  evaluation are due to the same confusion underlying W ittgenstein’s 
Lectures, w hich reduces artistic effects to em otional reactions. If  we follow 
this line o f a rgum ent, we will be  forced to ad o p t a  paradoxical position  and  
to assert that, because o f its adjectival handicap, any a ttem pt to justify a state-
12 A good exam ple of this attitude is Ernst Gombrich, who explicitly m ade his choice 
for art theory, even if his work has a sufficient philosophical am plitude to lay claims 
as aesthetics.
13 N orthrop  Frye, The Anatomy of Criticism, Princeton: New York, Princeton Universtiy 
Press, 1957, p. 18.
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m en t in  a r t exegesis is pointless, an d  every criticism  is a private, first-person 
affair which mysteriously tends to becom e public.
However, a fu rth e r substitu tion em erged  lateley, which dom inates art 
criticism and  especially literary criticism, and  com bines description an d  inter­
pretation. If descrip tion  is inevitably subjective and evaluation is im plicit, the 
co n cep t o f  in te rp re ta tio n  covers bo th  m eanings and  gives them  a new se­
m antic am plitude. B ut it necessarily adds reasons o r  motivations to  descrip­
tions an d  evaluations, som etim es in  a confusing assortm ent (for instance, 
M orris Weitz makes a strange distinction between descriptive interpretations and 
evaluative interpretations) .14 In terp re ta tio n  has been  abundan tly  d eb a ted  in 
writing, especially in  the theory  o f literatu re , w ithout a clear gu ideline to­
ward a u n ique m odel. But the m ain th ing  abou t in te rp re ta tio n  is that, be it 
in analytic o r herm eneu tical paradigm , it relies on  argum ents, irrespective 
o f their n a tu re .15 T herefo re , by in terp re ta tio n , which stands as its co u n ter­
part, any description becom es a p resentation  o f reasons. I hope this will make 
using o f the w ord explanation sound  m ore natu ra l in a discussion ab o u t art.
A gain, if we w ere to follow th e  in itial analytic d irec tio n  an d  c red it 
W ittgenstein’s view on aesthetic reasons, the whole theoretical assessm ent 
o f them  w ould be restric ted  to the observation tha t they »are o f the  n a tu re  
o f fu rth e r descriptions«, tha t they equals »the descrip tion  o f  defects«, and  
th a t their re la tion  to evaluation is »neither an  em pirically causal re la tion , 
n o r a logical necessary rela tion .«11' It seems an aleatoric re la tion , based on 
subjective experience; moreover, aesthetic justifica tion  by reasons can start 
from  a m ere insatisfaction, very m uch as description does. If this is true, there 
can be no  progress as concerns the theoretical status o f a r t exegesis, and  
justification  becom es useless, as a m ere  rationalisation  o f  personal im pres­
sions.
Suppose tha t W ittgenstein and  o th e r analytic ph ilosophers a re  right, 
and  descrip tion  is hopelessly subjective, because o f its d ep en d en ce  on  com ­
m on language and  because o f the adjectival handicap. Still, this basic sub­
jectivism , which also extends on  justification, does n o t change the n ee d  and  
the constra in t o f  reasons at all. It is precisely because descrip tion  can n o t
14 Morris Weitz, »Interpretation and the Visual Arts«, in Theoria, 39 (1973), pp. 101- 
112 .
15 Despite the com m on dependence on argum ents, it must be said tha t there is a major 
difference between these two types of argum entation: the herm eneutical discourse 
starts from an initial intuition and selects as reasons only the elem ents which confirm 
it (the procedure being known as hermeneutical circle), while the analytic one is 
grounded on a critical attitude which consists in confronting the pro and the counter 
arguments.
lr’ H. Morris-Jones, »The Logic of Criticism«, in The Monist, 50 (1966), p. 219.
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stand  by itself as a background  o f evaluation th a t reasons and  m otivations 
have been  in troduced  in the analytic assessment o f the language o f a r t criti­
cism. T h e  em otionalistic perspective I m en tioned  before -  which m igh t be 
a fair evaluation o f the discourse ab o u t art, o f  course, from  a logical p o in t 
o f  view -  is a false im p ed im en t for analytic aesthetics to be entirely  consis­
ten t and  credible: it will always be a com pulsory relation betw een the ob­
je c t  (in o u r case, the artistic object) and  the word tha t describes, evaluates, 
o r  simply designates it. T h e  object o f  art is a real object, and  any linguistic 
o r  verbal approach  o f it m ust face at least the m inim al conditions o f tru th  
an d  assertability. But the  work o f art is m ore than  a real object, it is a public 
object, an d  I would like to en h an ce  this fact in o rd e r to prevent the facile 
ob jection  th a t the reality o f the object can n o t be a sufficient cond ition  be­
cause there  are artistic objects whose existence is no t m aterial, bu t symbolic. 
If  th ere  is any difficulty in und erstan d in g  Russell’s idea ab o u t reality and  
existential statem ents, is quite sufficient to adm it that works o f art are »public 
an d  observable objects«. As Alan Torm ey says, »one does n o t in trospect, 
no tice, observe, feel o r detec t th a t h e ju d g es th a t q. C riticaljudgem ents are 
formed, n o t found , an d  th ough  the process o f form ing a critical ju d g m e n t 
may be private, the targe t o f the ju d g m en t -  the art work, the object ju d g e d
-  is no t.«17 H ere, as elsew here, if consistently stressed, subjectivism leads to 
the relativistic paradox, and  a logical paradox  is unacceptab le  in any th eo ­
retical o r  at least non-fictional discourse.18
T herefo re , reasons, as well as descriptions, canno t be entirely first-per­
son affairs. If  they were, a rt exegesis would be unintelligible and  m aybe even 
untransm issible. Probably, n o t even the polemics, which make the glory and  
the  relish o f a rt criticism  would n o t be possible, fo r there  w ould be no  ob­
je c t  to quarre l about. T he absolute subjectivity can n o t be expressed: if it is, 
it m eans it surely hides intersubjective elem ents. To sum m arize, th e re  are 
two things that becom e obvious from  the analysis o f description. They m ight 
so u n d  as m ere truism s, b u t they surely have the quality o f the sim ple tru ths 
w hich restores the path  to knowledge from  tim e to time.
First, we know th a t in com m on language descrip tion can n o t be o th er­
wise b u t adjectival. We also know that it never stands by itself and  always needs 
a fu r th e r a rgum ent, which im plies the use o f reasons. Second, the adjectival 
h and icap  proved to be m ore like an  advantage, because all the reasons, in­
c lud ing  aesthetic reasons, are tested. Two o f the m ost com m on tests are the 
em pirical test -  the confrontation o f the critical statem ent with the real object
17 Alan Tormey, »Criticaljudgem ents«, in Theoria, 39 (1973), p. 41.
18 For an excellent discussion on relativism and its internal limits, on fundam ental 
philosophical topics, see Thomas Nagel’s book The Last Word, 1997.
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-  and the corroboration  test, nam ely the test o f the professional com m unity, 
which always stands b eh in d  the w ord tradition.
If it is true that we can test and  justify o u r claims abou t art with no  need  
to get outside the com m on language and  to re ject aesthetics o r a r t exegesis 
as irrelevant to knowledge o r futile, why w ould it be necessary to in tro d u ce  
the concep t o f  explanation? A pparently, the analytic trad ition  itself seem s to 
m ake this o peration  pointless, since it credits descrip tion  as a p e rfec t sub­
stitute for explanation . For instance, in The Problem of Knowledge, Ayer shows 
tha t in philosophy descrip tion  works as exp lanation , since ph ilosoph ical 
p roblem s ca n n o t be settled  by ex p erim en t. This position  co incides with 
W ittgenstein’s view that art canno t be »explained« otherw ise than  by the use 
o f reasons (while science can use the  explanation  by causes o r by laws). It is 
largely considered  tha tjustifica tion  by reasons is the only possible exp lana­
tion in art, as it is seen as an instance o f »hum an affairs« (as well as psychol­
ogy, history, politics and  so on).
A nd why w ou ldn’t the presence o f reasons be en o u g h  fo r analytic aes­
thetics? I th in k  the answer to this question  im plies d ifferen t types o f  a rgu­
m ents. First, th ere  is a m ethodological argum ent: we still d o n ’t have a m ini­
mal m odel o f critical ju d g em en t an d  its justification , an d  we still miss a ty­
pology o f aesthetic reasons, n o t to m ention  a m odel o f accurate description. 
Maybe the use o f  this ex ternal m odel -  nam ely the scientific m odel -  w ould 
help , even if it is rightfully considered  too »strong« to be uncritically  trans­
fe rred  to a rt exegesis. T here  are two m ajor argum ents against this transfer. 
First, explanation  in science is sym m etrical to pred ic tion . Obviously, p red ic­
tion in  a rt is im possible, because each work o f a r t  is u n iq u e  an d  its subjec­
tive background  is beyond any doubt. We can hardly  talk ab o u t an  accura te  
re trod ic tion  in a rt exegesis (assum ing th a t descrip tion  an d  critical evalua­
tion can stand for re tro d ic tio n ).1-’
However, it m ust be said that the com parison with science is con tested  
only because m ore often than  no t the im age o f science is naive an d  abridged. 
T he doubtfu l ch arac te r o f the symmetry betw een exp lanation  an d  p red ic­
tion is a com m on place in epistemology, and  in o rd e r to illustrate this I would 
like to quo te Patrick S uppes’s prophecy that »we shall never be able to m ove 
from  good explanations to good predictions«.20 In  science, it is a com m on  
situation to face events th a t »are n o t pred ic tab le , yet in o n e  sense exp la in ­
able«,21 an d  h ere  Suppes is n o t talking ab o u t the  sciences o f  m an  o r  »hu­
19 Michael Scriven, »The Objectivity of Aesthetic Evaluation«, in The Monist, 50 (1966), 
pp. 159-87.
20 Patrick Suppes, »Explaining the U npredictable«, in Suppes, Models and Mehtods in the 
Philosophy of Science: Selected Essays, D ordrecht/B oston: Kluwer, 1993, p. 119.
21 Suppes, op.cit., p. 115.
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m an affairs«. I w ould suggest tha t th ree  o f the  types o f  explanations Suppes 
recom m ends as m ost plausible in science pose no  prob lem  to art exegesis: 
ex post facto exp lanation  by reasons, teleological explanation , and  exp lana­
tion  by random ness. (For instance, although I never saw an exam ple o f  this 
last one, I th ink  it could  be very in teresting  to exercise it with regard  to con­
tem porary  a leam orph ic  art, an d  n o t only.) A n o th er in teresting  p roposal 
com es from  Von W right, who, in o rd e r to e lude the problem s o f m e th o d ­
ological m onism  in the sciences o f m an concedes to a form  o f practical syl­
logism w hich could  eventually explain m ost o f the h um an  actions.
T h ere  are m any o th e r argum ents to su p p o rt the need  o f explanation  
in  art exegesis th a t I can m en tion  here. Personally, I take the search fo r »an 
aesthetic co u n te rp art o f science«22 -  which probably  is a typically analytical 
syndrom e -  as perfectly  legitim ate, as long as Russell’s observations ab o u t 
language and  things are valid. After all, the work o f a rt is a real object, it is 
a  p a rt o f  reality as m uch as a natu ra l event, and  all the statem ents ab o u t it 
m ust face the criterion o f tru th  and  adequacy. However, the m ajor argum en t 
th a t I w ould like to b ring  in favour o f explanation  in a rt exegesis brings m e 
back to the why- questions I have m en tioned  before.
D espite their in h e re n t problem s, there  is probably no  reason why de­
scrip tion  and  in te rp re ta tio n  can n o t be accepted  as an app ro p ria te  answer 
to the how-question ab o u t art. Still, this canno t replace the o th e r m ajor ques­
tion  which I th ink  is unavoidable, here  as m uch  as elsew here, because it is 
an  essential e lem ent o f the hum an  m ind. D escription is n o t enough , and  
we will always n eed  an d  look for explanations, even if this search is n o t al­
ways explicitly assum ed. Personally, I take any aesthetics to be mostly an  at­
tem p t to answer the im plicit wA)>-question o f art. To answer this question, 
all we have to do is to re tu rn  constantly to o u r fundam en tal concepts and  
problem s, and  to keep the critical spirit awake.
22 Shusterm an, op.cit., p. 7. 
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